Cleveland State Law Review
Volume 47

Issue 4

Article

1999

Crimes and Errors Impossible to Commit: Defining Away the
Fourth Amendment - Wyoming v. Houghton
Rachel Gader-Shafran

Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Fourth Amendment Commons

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Recommended Citation
Rachel Gader-Shafran, Crimes and Errors Impossible to Commit: Defining Away the Fourth Amendment Wyoming v. Houghton, 47 Clev. St. L. Rev. 575 (1999)
available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss4/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For
more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.

CRIMES AND ERRORS1 IMPOSSIBLE TO COMMIT:
DEFINING AWAY THE FOURTH AMENDMENT. WYOMING v.
HOUGHTON, 56 U.S. 295 (1999)
RACHEL GADER-SHAFRAN2

I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 576
II. SUMMARY OF FACTS ............................................................ 579
III. BACKGROUND...................................................................... 580
A. Shared Vision: The Framers and
the Fourth Amendment ................................................ 580
B. The People ................................................................... 581
C. Unreasonable Searches and Seizures.......................... 582
D. The Warrant, Probable Cause and
the Neutral Magistrate................................................. 582
E. The Birth of the Exclusionary Rule.
The Twin Imperatives: Judicial Integrity
and Deterrence ............................................................ 584
F. The Demise of the Exclusionary Rule:
Cost-Benefit Analysis................................................... 587
G. Filling in the Contours:
The Automobile Exceptions ......................................... 589
IV. SUMMARY OF THE COURT’S OPINION .................................. 591
V. ANALYSIS ............................................................................ 595
A. Original Intent and Tradition:
The Only Guides to the Fourth
Amendment Question ................................................... 595

1

GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1975). “There would be many crimes and errors which it would
be beyond (a person’s) power to commit, simply because they were nameless and therefore
unimaginable. Newspeak was designed not to extend but to diminish the range of thought, and
this purpose was indirectly assisted by cutting the choice of words down to a minimum. Take
for example the well-known passage from the declaration of Independence:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that the are
endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are
instituted among men, deriving their power from the consent of the governed. That
whenever any form of Government becomes destructive of those ends, it is the right of
the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute new Government . . .
It would have been quite impossible to render this into Newspeak while keeping the
original. The nearest one could come to doing so would be to swallow up the whole
passage in the single word crimethink.”
2

M.A. Applied Linguistics, UCLA, 1991; J.D. Washington College of Law, American
University, 2002. For Ann, Bertram, WSM and Zelda. Lovers of knowledge, truth and justice.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the early morning hours of July 23, 1995 Sandra Houghton, a passenger in an
automobile,3 thought she was protected by the Fourth Amendment.4 She thought she
had a guaranteed right to be secure in her person against unreasonable searches and
seizures based solely upon police discretion. She also thought that absent a warrant,
the police would need to base any search and seizure of her person and/or her
belongings upon individualized probable cause.
Sandra Houghton had no idea that the Court would use her case to help eliminate
Fourth Amendment guarantees.5 The language of the Majority in Wyoming v.
Houghton6 is reminiscent of legal scholar Akhil Reed Amar7 who champions the

3
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999). The United States Supreme Court granted
Wyoming’s writ of certiorari to rule on whether police officers violated the Fourth
Amendment when they searched the personal belongings of a passenger inside an automobile
that they had probable cause to believe contained contraband. The question as stated by the
Court makes no direct mention of the issue concerning lack of individualized suspicion and
probable cause.
4
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
5
For an impression of Justice Scalia’s view on the Fourth Amendment see California v.
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). “The Fourth Amendment does
not by its terms require a prior warrant for searches and seizures . . . What it explicitly states
regarding warrants is by way of limitation upon their issuance rather than requirements of their
use.” Id.
6

526 U.S. at 295.

7

Southmayd Professor, Yale Law School.
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complete erasure8 of the exclusionary rule9 and the redefining of the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment10 altogether.
Until Houghton the Court steadfastly held that the so-called “automobile
exception”11 to the warrant requirement did not apply to a search of an automobile
passenger12 or her belongings by virtue of her “mere presence”13 in a suspected car14
without individualized probable cause.15
The Court previously rejected the notion that the container in which contraband
could be hidden established the scope of a warrantless search of a vehicle16. Rather,
the Court defined the scope by the object of the search and the places where there
was probable cause to believe the contraband could be found.17
The focus of the Fourth Amendment is the people18 and individualized probable
cause pertaining to them. In Houghton the Court has constructed a new lexicon that

8

Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 761
(1994). “Make no mistake: I come to praise the Fourth Amendment, not to gut it.” The choice
of allusion to Mark Antony’s speech in William Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar is an unfortunate
choice. Mark Antony’s “ I come to bury Caesar, not to praise him.” (William Shakespeare,
Julius Caesar, Act III, Sc. II) speech has been understood from its inception to be an
ironic/satirical foil for Antony to praise Caesar under the noses of the authorities. Does Amar
intend for us to understand that he really does come to gut the amendment and not to praise it?
9
Id. at 758. Amar believes that the exclusionary rule must be done away with in favor of
civil juries and civil damage actions in which government officials are to be held liable for
unreasonable intrusions against person, property and privacy.
10

Id. “The Fourth Amendment today an embarrassment. Much of what the Supreme Court
has said in the last half century—that the Amendment generally calls for warrants and
probable cause for all searches and seizures, and exclusion of all searches and seizures, and
exclusion of illegally obtained evidence—is initially plausible but ultimately misguided.” Id.
at 757. “The words of the Fourth Amendment really do mean what they say. They do not
require warrants, even presumptively, for searches and seizures. They do not require probable
cause for all searches and seizures without warrants.” Id. at 801.
11
Lawrence A. Mintz, Requiem for the Exclusionary Rule, 19 HOWARD L. REV. 161
(1976).
12

United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S 581 (1948) (holding that the existence of reasonable
cause for searching an automobile believed to be carrying contraband does not warrant the
search of an occupant thereof, especially when if the contraband sought might be concealed on
the person).
13

Id. at 585.

14

526 U.S. at 295.

15

Id. at 309.

16

United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982) (the Court reasoned that the scope of the
warrantless search of an automobile is not defined but the nature of the container but rather by
the object of the search and the places where there is probable cause to believe the contraband
will be found).
17

Id. at 824.

18

Ronald J. Bacigal, Putting the People Back into the Fourth Amendment, 62 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 359 (Mar. 1994).
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alters the accepted focus of the Fourth Amendment, the warrant requirement and the
exclusionary rule, to the contents of the automobile.19
The decision in Houghton is the most recent of the Supreme Court’s efforts to gut
the Fourth Amendment and constrict the protections afforded by the exclusionary
rule under the guise of maintaining a balance20 between effective law enforcement
and individual privacy21.
On the surface, Houghton seems like the next logical step in the present Court’s
gutting of the Fourth Amendment in general and the exclusionary rule in particular.
Yet, by allowing police officers to search the belongings of a passenger, without
individualized probable cause, the court has redefined the guarantees of the Fourth
Amendment.
Over the past 30 years, the Court has redefined the exclusionary rule,22 and the
scope23 and content 24 of the Fourth Amendment. In 1975 Justice Brennan
challenged his colleagues on the Burger Court25 by saying that if they (were)
determined to discard the exclusionary rule in Fourth Amendment cases, they should

19

526 U.S. at 295.

20

Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (holding that a police officer who lawfully
stops a vehicle for a traffic violation has the right to order the driver out of the automobile to
protect the officer’s safety). See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996) (holding that a police
officer can lawfully order a driver to exit the vehicle as reasonable and wholly objective under
the totality of the circumstances). See also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997) (holding
that a police officer can lawfully order a passenger to exit the vehicle when stopped on a
routine traffic violation even when the officer has no reason to suspect a passenger has
committed a crime of threatened an officer’s safety).
21
Chris K. Visser, Comment, Without a Warrant, Probable Cause, or Reasonable
Suspicion: Is There Any Meaning to the Fourth Amendment While Driving a Car, 35 HOUS. L.
REV. 1683, 1724 (1999). In evaluating Fourth Amendment reasonableness the Court balances
law enforcement interests against privacy, balancing; 1) the officer’s safety in avoiding violent
confrontations during traffic stops; and 2) minimizing the hazard of injury to an injury of a
police office standing by the side of the road, against minimal intrusions into a driver’s
privacy.
22

Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995) (holding that the exclusionary rule did not require
suppression of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment where erroneous
information leading to a search resulted from a clerical error of court employees who did not
keep records up to date).
23

United States v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991) (stating that a defendant was not seized
until the officer tackled him. Thus the drug discarded before the chase were admitted into
evidence).
24

California v. Ciraola, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (stating that warrantless aerial observation of
fenced areas adjacent to a home was not an “unreasonable” search under the Fourth
Amendment). See also John M. Junker, The Structure of the Fourth Amendment: The Scope
of the Protection, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1105 (1989).
25

The Warren Court 1953-1969. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A
POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 251-95 (3d ed. 1992) (for a
discussion of the make up the Warren Court and an analysis of the underling motivation in the
process of presidential selection and appointments).
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do so forthrightly and be done with it and not “covertly” erode an important rule 61
years in the making.26
Twenty-four years later his challenge becomes even more relevant as the Burger
Court’s progeny27 continues the dismemberment of the Fourth Amendment and the
exclusionary rule.
This Note contends that the Court’s decision to adopt the Houghton approach to
the automobile warrant exception is problematic for three reasons. First, the Court
has erroneously interpreted the historical evidence behind the creation of the Fourth
Amendment. Second, the Court, by chipping away at stare decisis, is disrupting the
foundations of American jurisprudence and the development of the law. Third, by
creating a new lexicon, changing the meanings of the words, the Court is trying to
define away the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment.
This Note will briefly summarize the facts of Houghton and review the historical
purpose for the creation of the Fourth Amendment and then summarize the Court’s
opinion and the dissenting opinion. Finally, this note will analyze the significance of
this “newly minted”28 test.
II. SUMMARY OF FACTS
On July 23, 1995, Sandra Houghton was one of three people in the front seat of a
car stopped by a Wyoming Highway Patrol officer for speeding and driving with a
faulty brake light.29 While the officer questioned David Young (the driver) he
noticed a syringe in Young’s shirt pocket.30 The officer called for back up and
returned to the car and asked Young what the syringe was for; Young answered that
he used it to take drugs.31 Backup officers asked the two passengers to identify
themselves and Houghton stated falsely that she was Sandra James and that she did
not have identification.32
The officer searching Young’s car, in light of his admission, found a purse on the
back seat of the car that Houghton claimed as hers.33 Continuing the search of the
purse, the officer found a wallet, which he opened and removed from it, a driver’s
license identifying Sandra K. Houghton.34 The officer also found a brown pouch
containing drug paraphernalia and a syringe with 60 ccs of methamphetamine;
Houghton denied this was hers and stated she was ignorant of how it came to be in
26
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 561-62 (1975). “To attempt covertly the erosion
of an important principle over 61 years in the making as applied to federal courts clearly
demeans the adjudicatory function, and the institutional integrity of this Court.” Id.
27
The Rehnquist Court 1986-Present. See Abraham, supra note 25, at 349-69 (for a
discussion on the make up of the Rehnquist Court and its views).
28

526 U.S. at 310.

29

Id. at 297.

30

Id. at 298.

31

Id.

32

Id.

33

526 U.S. at 298.

34

Id.
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her purse.35 The officer arrested Houghton.36 The State of Wyoming charged
Houghton with felony possession of methamphetamine.37
On appeal Houghton raised several challenges to her conviction including the
district court’s denial of her motion to suppress the evidence found in her purse.38
The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the conviction holding that an officer with
probable cause to search a vehicle may search all containers that might conceal the
object of the search; but, if the officer knows or should have known that a container
belongs to a passenger who is not suspected of criminal activity, then the container is
outside the scope of the search unless someone had the opportunity to conceal
contraband within it to avoid detection.39 The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the
district court’s denial of the motion to suppress40 and remanded the case for
disposition in accord with their opinion.41
The United States Supreme Court granted Wyoming’s writ of certiorari to rule on
whether police officers violated the Fourth Amendment when they searched the
personal belongings of a passenger inside an automobile that they had probable
cause to believe contained contraband.42 The court held that “[p]olice officers with
probable cause to search a car may inspect passengers’ belongings found in the car
that are capable of concealing the object of the search.”43
III. BACKGROUND
A. Shared Vision: The Framers and the Fourth Amendment
The Framers of the Fourth Amendment shared a common moment in time. They
reflected on a past of Writs of Assistance,44 James Otis’ role in the Paxton Case in

35

Id.

36

Id. The officer also found fresh needle-track marks on Houghton’s arms.

37

Id. Houghton was charged with felony possession of methamphetamine in a liquid
amount greater than three-tenths of a gram which is punishable by imprisonment for not more
than 5 years and a fine not more than $2,500.00 or both under WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-7-1031
(c) (iii) (Supp. 1996).
38

Houghton v. Wyoming, 956 P.2d 363, 364 (1998). The trial court reasoned that the
officer had probable cause to search the car for contraband and thus all containers therein that
could hold contraband.
39

Id. at 372.

40

Id. at 366 n.2. The Wyoming Supreme Court stated that the Wyoming Constitution
article 1 § 4 is somewhat stronger than its federal counterpart, in that it is mandatory that the
search warrant be issued upon affidavit.
41

Id. at 372.

42

Houghton, 526 U.S. at 298. The question as stated by the Court makes no direct mention
of the issue concerning lack of individualized suspicion and probable cause.
43

Id. at 295.

44

Visser, supra note 21, at 1700.
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1761,45 the Sugar Act of 1764,46 the seizure of John Hancock’s sloop, the Liberty in
1768,47 the Wilkes Case in 176948 and widespread intimidation and corruption by
customs inspectors49 who were granted unchallenged authority to search and seize50
under the auspices of the Vice-Admiralty Courts.
An historical inquiry into the Framers’ intent in creating the Fourth Amendment
must be viewed in terms of the drafters shared consensus of what those categories
were.51 The Framers did not need to enumerate the specific categories of searches
and seizures they thought unreasonable. The Framers’ discourse reflected their
shared cultural sensibilities when they wrote:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.52
B. The People
The first words of the Fourth Amendment reflect the Framers concern for the
people and their ‘rights’. The Framers did not view “the people” as merely a
collection of private interests.53 The Debates of the Convention of Virginia on the
drafting of the Constitution reflect the controversy the term “the People” ignited.54
Some delegates believed that “[t]he origin of the General Government, the source of
45
Id. at n.118. The British government used writs of assistance (among other things) to
enforce import duties . . . to prevent the American colonies from trading outside the British
Empire. Sixty-three Boston merchants challenged the writs and hired James Otis, Jr. to argue
the case. “He was a flame of fire! Every man of a crowded audience appeared to me to go
away, as I did, ready to take arms against writs of assistance . . . Then and there the Child
Independence was born.” (citing John Adams Memoirs).
46

Bacigal, supra note 18, at 366.

47

Tracey Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment: A Historical Overview, 77
B.U. L. REV. 925, 964 (1997).
48

Id. at 933.

49

Bacigal, supra note 18, at 377.

50

Id. at 372.

51

Maclin, supra note 47, at 974 n.270.

52

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

53

Bacigal, supra note 18, at 384. “Values are public as well private in origin, originating
in political engagement and dialogue as well as in private experience . . . The people
conceived of themselves as acting to advance the public interest, and they came together to
discuss, to deliberate upon, and ultimately to decide on the court their society would take.”
(citing Frank I. Michelman, Politics and Values or What’s Really Wrong with Rational
Review?, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 487, 509 (1979)).
54
JOHN B. DILLON, NOTES ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES 42 (1871) (Bayard’s Brief Exposition of the Constitution of the United States
from Debates of the Convention of Virginia 1788).
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all its power, was a matter too important to be left in doubt, and it is therefore
declared to be ordained and established by ‘the People of the United States.’”55
Others believed the introductory expression of ‘We the People” improper.56 ‘The
People’ for whom the contrivances of States, Kingdoms and Empires are intended57
carried the day over those who believed “We the State governments”58 might be
more proper.
C. Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
The American experience of unreasonable searches and seizures from many
quarters led the Framers to create the right to be free from promiscuous intrusion.59
Viewing the general warrant as law enforcement instruments that substantially
undermined their privacy and security, Americans strongly resented them.60 In the
most widely held protests on the search process prior to the amendment, the
Continental Congress, in 1774, had unconditionally condemned promiscuous,
warrantless searches by customs and excise officers.61 “Legislation, case law, legal
treatises, pamphlets, newspapers, constitutional debates, and correspondence in
America during the 1780’s condemned not only the general warrant but also other
methods of search and seizure so consistently that their constitutional designation as
unreasonable would have been almost superfluous.”62 Some scholars believe that the
history behind the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures tells us more than the nebulous language of the text about the right.63
Conversely, there are scholars who contend that as long as government officials act
reasonably when they intrude upon privacy and property, the commands of the
Fourth Amendment have been satisfied.64
D. The Warrant, Probable Cause and the Neutral Magistrate
Perhaps more so than any other provision of the Bill of Rights, the Fourth
Amendment is profoundly antigovernment.65 More than any other constitutional

55

Id. at 43.

56

Id.

57

Id. at 44.

58

Id. at 43.

59

Maclin, supra note 47, at 954-55.

60

Id.

61

Id. at 955 n.178. “In short the debate on search and seizure of 1787-88 not only
provided impetus for what became the Fourth Amendment but defined its contents. That
debate connected the enlarged understanding of unreasonable searches and seizures that had
emerged after 1782 with the guarantee against those procedures of 1789.” Id.
62

Id. at 974.

63

Id. at 938.

64

Amar, supra note 8, at 757-58.

65

Bacigal, supra note 18, at 363 n.15 (stating that “more than any other single
constitutional provision the amendment stands between us and the police state, for its central
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provision, the Fourth Amendment stands between the people and a police state, for it
contends that police (or other governmental) conduct that interferes with a person’s
liberty, bodily integrity, or right to exclude others from what is his shall be subject to
judicial control.66
The Framers understood the need for specific warrants based on probable cause
approved by a neutral magistrate when they wrote “ . . . no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized”.67
Between 1776 and 1787, the American Law of search and seizure underwent a
transformation that separated it from British law. The most obvious mark of that
transformation was the written constitutional acknowledgment of a right respecting
search and seizure by most of the new states.68
The colonial experience of general warrants and writs of assistance led to
colonial legislative bodies, like Massachusetts Bay, enacting bills establishing the
specific warrant as the conventional means of search and seizure.69 Americans in the
1760’s began to reject the general warrant not only because it was not specific but
also because they associated it with the violent British efforts to subjugate them
politically70.
The probable cause requirement became a focus for the colonists when British
searches of American ships began to threaten not only their privacy, but also their
economic livelihoods. The Sugar Act of 1764 barred shipowners from suing the
customs officers who seized their vessels if a judge found, retrospectively, probable
cause to seize the ship.71 This, along with the deputizing of Royal Navy personnel as
customs agents and the seizing of ships belonging to Henry Laurens of South
Carolina and John Hancock of Massachusetts, lead to organized protests over the
wrongful seizure of their ships without probable cause. A Boston Town Meeting

premise is that police . . . conduct . . . shall be subject to judicial control) (citing JAMES B.
WHITE, JUSTICE IN TRANSLATION 177 (1990)).
66

Bacigal, supra note 18, at 362.

67

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

68

Maclin, supra note 47, at 972-73.

69

Id. at 942-44 (revealing that within two years of the Excise controversy the specific
warrant as the standard mode of search and seizure in the colonies. Although these early
specific warrants would not meet current constitutional standards, many contained various
procedural safeguards that the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment would subsequently
incorporate).
70
Id. at 943 n.94 (hostility toward general warrants and promiscuous intrusions in
Massachusetts dates back to at least the mid-seventeenth century. In 1644, after a sheriff
entered a boarding house without a warrant to arrest a drunk, an angry mob unsuccessfuly
attempted to rescue the man).
71

Maclin, supra note 47, at 961 nn. 207 & 209.
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report organized by James Otis Jr.72 and John Adams complained that confiscation of
the ships was without probable cause.73
The text of the Fourth Amendment did not emerge in a vacuum.74 The right to be
free from unreasonable search and seizure owes much to history. The specific
warrant mandated by the Warrant Clause evolved over centuries of legal thought and
practice . . . the evolutionary process that produced the Amendment also brought
about the renunciation of historic precedent.75 The Fourth Amendment did not
emerge from colonial precedents; rather it repudiated them.76
The Framers of the Constitution created the Fourth Amendment as a direct
response to the practically unrestrained and judicially unsupervised searches
associated with general warrants and writs of assistance.77
E. The Birth of the Exclusionary Rule. The Twin Imperatives: Judicial Integrity and
Deterrence
The earliest method of suppressing unreasonable searches and seizures was not
the exclusionary rule, but monetary punishments that juries imposed on those who
searched and seized unlawfully.78 The prospect of incurring financial ruin at the

72

Visser, supra note 21, at 1700 (commenting that when Mr. Otis raised the thencontroversial argument that courts should review legislation and overturn illegitimate laws, he
helped sow the seeds of later American constitutional practice).
73

Maclin, supra note 47, at 962.

74

Id. at 938 (noting that several centuries of British and American legal theory and practice
gave shape and meaning to the Fourth Amendment). Id. at 938 n.65 (stating that the text of
the Fourth Amendment articulated ideas that had percolated through Anglo-American law for
centuries).
75

Id. at 972.

76

LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION 139, 224
(1988). See Maclin, supra note 47, at 972 (“[t]he ideas comprising the Fourth Amendment
reversed rather than formalized colonial precedents. Reasonable search and seizure in colonial
America closely approximated whatever the searcher thought reasonable.”). See also Amar,
supra note 8, at 767-68. Contradicting this thinking by criticizing the warrant preference rule
(which holds that a judicial warrant is a necessary precondition of a reasonable search unless
good reasons call for proceeding without one) as not expressly provided for in the Amendment
and lacking historical support in eighteenth or nineteenth century thinking on the subject. Id.
77
Visser, supra note 21, at 1683, 1699. See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100-01
(1959) (noting that abuses associated with general warrants and writs of assistance prompted
the authors of various state declarations of rights, early courts, and the Framers of the
Constitution to require probable cause as a prerequisite to issuance of a warrant to arrest or
search); See also JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT, 2021 (1966) (describing the Fourth Amendment as a procedural safeguard rooted in American
and English experiences).
78

Maclin, supra note 47, at 935 n.59. See Amar, supra note 8, at 757-67 (describing a
structure to return to civil remedies); see also Warren E. Burger, Who Will Watch The
Watchman?, 14 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1964) (describing civil tort remedies to Fourth Amendment
violations).
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hands of a jury undercut the incentive to conduct any search and seizure that the
community, in the form of a jury, might find unreasonable.79
Since the text of the Fourth Amendment provides no remedy for its violation,
courts for over a century after the Revolution admitted evidence obtained in an
illegal search.80 Not until 1866 did the Supreme Court decision in Boyd v. United
States81 plant the seed of what was to become the exclusionary rule.82 The Court
concluded that papers and books illegally seized had to be excluded as a by-product
of the Fifth Amendment ban on compelling a man to be witness against himself.83
The Court in Boyd did not link the violation to the Fourth Amendment.84 In 1904 the
Court attempted to distinguish Adams v. New York85 from Boyd and essentially
overruled the earlier case. In Adams the court found no unreasonable search and
seizure had occurred86 but stated that even if a search were unreasonable, a court
could not stop during a trial to address the issue of how police officers obtained
evidence.87
Ten years after Adams the Court developed and used the exclusionary rule in
federal criminal trials in its landmark decision in Weeks v. United States.88 Weeks
also established the “judicial integrity” rationale for the exclusionary rule believing
that restraints and limits must be put on officers and courts so that evidence obtained
in an illegal search and seizure will not be protected under the guise of law.89

79
Elisa Masterson White, Criminal Procedure: Good Faith, Big Brother, and You: The
United States Supreme Court’s Latest Good Faith Exception to the Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule. Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995), 18 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. J.
533, 537 (1996). A common law remedy of a civil suit was what the British common law
applied when no specific enacted law contradicted it. Id. (citing BRADFORD P. WILSON,
ENFORCING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A JURISPRUDENTIAL HISTORY (1986)).
80

White, supra note 79, at 537.

81

116 U.S. 616 (1866) (noting that only testimonial evidence such as papers or books—not
contraband such as drugs or guns—had to be excluded because the exclusion was a by-product
of the Fifth Amendment’s ban on compulsory testimony).
82

Boyd, 116 U.S. at 617. The opinion did not make clear whether the Fourth Amendment
violation alone required the exclusion.
83

Id. at 633.

84

Id. at 630-35. Justice Miller’s concurring opinion found no Fourth Amendment search
or seizure violation in this case. Id. at 638-40 (Miller, J. concurring).
85

192 U.S. 585 (1904).

86

Id. at 594. Officers received a warrant for “gambling paraphernalia” but also seized
other private papers and used them in evidence against the defendant at trial. Id.
87

Id. at 595.

88
232 U.S. 383 (1914). After the defendants arrest in his place of business a U.S. Marshall
searched his home and confiscated his property without a search warrants. Id. at 386. This
case was distinguished from Boyd by basing the reversal of the lower court’s ruling on the
Fourth Amendment alone. Id. at 390-91.
89

Id. at 388. See also Olmstead v. United States, 227 U.S. 438, 469-71 (1928) (“[i]f the
government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the law.”) (Brandies, J., dissenting).
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Although the Court continued to broaden the exclusionary rule over the next
forty-seven years90 it was not until 1961 in its landmark decision in Mapp v. Ohio,91
that the Court held that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments required
unconstitutionally obtained evidence be excluded in state, as well as, federal courts.92
The Warren Court93 majority in Mapp continued the “imperative of judicial
integrity” and deterrence rationale as the purpose of the exclusionary rule,94
calculated to prevent and not repair, to deter and thereby to compel respect for the
Constitution by removing any incentive to disregard it.95 The decision was met with
great controversy.96
Seven years later in Terry v. Ohio,97 Chief Justice Warren conceded some
problems inherent in the exclusionary rule established in Mapp, recognizing that the
rule had its limits as a tool of judicial control and in some contexts the rule was
ineffective as a deterrent.98

90
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (the Court moved away
from the property based application of the Fourth Amendment and forbade the government to
use papers or derivative property illegally seized). See also Bradford P. Wilson, Forgotten
Points in the “Exclusionary Rule Debate”, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1237, 1278-79 (1983); Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). (The Court applied the Fourth Amendment to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, but the evidence was still admissible
in federal court). Id. See also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 208 n.2 (1960) (the
Court reexamined what had become known as the “silver platter doctrine”) (quoting Lustig v.
United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949) (holding that federal courts must suppress evidence
obtained by state officers)). Id.
91

367 U.S. 643 (1961).

92

Id. at 655.

93

The Warren Court 1953-1969. See Abraham, supra note 25, at 251-95 (for a discussion
of the make up the Warren Court and an analysis of the underling motivation in the process of
presidential selection and appointments).
94
367 U.S at 659. See Elkins, 364 U.S. at 223-24 (discussing the “imperative of judicial
integrity” as a reason to exclude illegally obtained evidence).
95

Elkins, 364 U.S. at 221.

96

Burger, supra note 78, at 1 (describing the inefficiency of the rule). See RICHARD
NIXON, TOWARDS FREEDOM FROM FEAR 13 (1968). “The barbed wire of legalisms that a
majority of one of the supreme Court has erected to protect a suspect from invasion of his
rights has effectively shielded hundreds of criminals from punishment.” See also Richard
Nixon, N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1968 at 20 col.4 (on the night he accepted the candidacy for
president, “Let us always respect, as I do, our courts and those who serve on them, but let us
also recognize that some of our courts in their decisions have gone too far in weakening the
peace forces as against the criminal forces in this country”).
97
392 U.S. 1 (1968) (authorizing limited searches of the outer clothing of a person
detained to detect weapons).
98

Id. at 12-15. The Chief Justice came to believe that the rule could not be properly
invoked to exclude products of legitimate police investigative techniques on the ground that
much conduct which is closely similar involves unwarranted intrusions upon constitutional
protections. Id.
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F. The Demise of the Exclusionary Rule: Cost-Benefit Analysis
The twin imperatives of judicial integrity and deterrence99 were immediately
taken up after the establishment of the judicially conservative, strict constructionist100
Burger Court.101 In 1969, with Alderman v. United States102 the court determined
that standing applied only to those whose rights had been violated.103 The decision
applied a cost-benefit analysis104 based on the reasoning that the benefit of deterring
police misconduct by extending the exclusionary rule to third parties would not
outweigh the cost of allowing the more guilty criminals go free.105
In 1971, Chief Justice Burger called for the creation of other remedies to the
exclusionary rule and then its abandonment in Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics.106 Two other cases tried that same year, Whitley v.
Warden107 and Coolidge v. New Hampshire,108 failed to convince a majority of
Justices that the Fourth Amendment does not expressly command that evidence
obtained by an infraction should always be excluded from evidence. Yet the Chief
Justice asserted that judicial integrity was not necessarily damaged by inclusion of
tainted evidence and suggested that there be some narrowing of the rule’s thrust to

99
Norman M. Robertson, Reason and the Fourth Amendment-The Burger Court and the
Exclusionary Rule, 46 FORDHAM L. R. 139, 152 (1977).
100

Id. at 150-54. Richard Nixon was in a unique position. Between 1969 and 1971 he
filled the Chief Justice position with Warren Burger and when Justices White and Black
retired, Nixon appointed William Rehnquist (the present Chief Justice) and Lewis Powell.
With the ascent of Rehnquist and Powell the Nixon Court was complete and the majority of
judicial conservatism was ripe to create grave limits on the exclusionary rule’s power. See
JAMES F. SIMON, IN HIS OWN IMAGE: THE SUPREME COURT IN RICHARD NIXON’S AMERICA
(1973) (for further discussion on the strategy for choosing the Justices at 122-48).
101
The Burger Court 1969-1986. See Abraham, supra note 25, at 296-348 (for a
discussion on the make up of the Burger Court and its views).
102

394 U.S. 165 (1969).

103

Id. at 171-72.

104

WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE A TREATIES ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 11.4(f) 294-99 (1996) (for a discussion on deterrence and cost-benefit analyses).
105

Alderman, 394 U.S. at 174-75.

106
403 U.S. 388, 420 (1971). “Instead of continuing to enforce the suppression doctrine
inflexibly, rigidly, and mechanically, we should view it as one of the experimental steps in the
great tradition of the common law and acknowledge its shortcomings. But in the same spirit
we should be prepared to discontinue what the experience of over half a century has shown
neither deters errant officers nor affords a remedy to the totally innocent victims of official
misconduct. I do not propose, however, that we abandon the suppression doctrine until some
meaningful alternative can be developed.” Id. (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
107

401 U.S. 560 (1971) (holding that an arrest made by police based on a police bulletin
issued without probable cause was therefore an arrest made without probable cause).
108
403 U.S. 443 (1971) (holding that a neutral magistrate was required to issue a warrant
and in this case the State Attorney General had issued a warrant in his capacity of justice of
the peace).
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eliminate the anomalies it had produced.109 It was in Coolidge that Justice Harlan
called for Mapp to be overruled and that there be a re-examination of the rule based
on a Court examination of the experience of the states.110
During the years 1973 to 1975 the Court fashioned a set of new doctrines in
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,111 United States v. Robinson,112 United States v.
Calandra113 and United States v. Peltier.114 Justice Brennan believed that if the
vague contours of the Burger Court’s newly fashioned rules were to be filled in, it

109

Id. at 454. See Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure,
37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970). Two studies noting that the deterrent value is minimal. Some
of the reasons cited in the study are:
The application of the rule only benefits the guilty. The innocent man whose rights
are violated gains no advantage from the exclusionary rule. He must sue civilly to
secure damages. The procedure which gives nothing to the innocent yet gives
freedom to the guilty, destroys respect for law far more than police misconduct will.
The rule fosters false testimony by police officers who are under severe public
pressure to apprehend offenders and are fearful that minor technical errors will result
in their escape.
The existence of the exclusionary rule creates a haven for the corrupt law enforcement
officer and allows him to immunize an offender while appearing to do an aggressive
job of law enforcement. Id.
110

403 U.S at 492-93.

111

412 U.S. 218 (1973) (holding that warrantless searches may be conducted with the
voluntary consent of the target even without a specific warning by the police advising the
suspect of his right to withhold consent).
112
414 U.S. 218 (1973) (holding that a full search of a person incident to a full custody
arrest may be undertaken without regard to what a court may later decide was the probability
of was that the detainee was carrying a weapon or not). See Robertson, supra note 99, at 156.
(A clear and broad exception to the warrant requirement was thus recognized).
113
414 U.S. 338 (1974) (holding that a grand jury witness may not refuse to testify
concerning evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment). The Court held that
questioning a witness based on illegally seized evidence is a “derivative use” of evidence and
is not a further violation of the Constitution. (Calandra essentially followed the pattern of
cost-benefit analysis established in Alderman). Id. at 354.
114

422 U.S. 531 (1975) (holding that if the police officer believed in reasonable good faith
that the evidence they seized would be admissible in court, the imperative of judicial integrity
would not be offended ). This case was decided a short time after the Court held, in AlmeidaSanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1975), that a warrantless automobile search by border
police conducted without probable cause was unconstitutional under the fourth amendment.
But the Court decided that it did not have to make Almeida-Sanchez retroactive in this case.
Id.
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would forecast the demise of the exclusionary rule115 and cause the judicial
development of Fourth Amendment rights to be stopped “dead in its tracks.”116
G. Filling in the Contours: The Automobile Exceptions
During this century the Court has created numerous exceptions to the
exclusionary rule, including attenuation,117 independent source,118 inevitable
discovery119, and good faith exceptions.120
The so-called “automobile exception”121 to the warrant requirement was first
enunciated by the Court in 1925 in Carroll v. United States.122 The mobility doctrine
was slow to develop, but by the 1970’s the Court began to focus on not only
extending the Carroll Doctrine123 itself but also on extending the scope of the

115

Peltier, 422 U.S. at 551. See Mintz, supra note 11, at 161. See also U.S. v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). The rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard
Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal
constitutional right of the party aggrieved. With that one rule the Court seemed to settle the
question of the rule’s constitutional basis. Id.
116

Peltier, 422 U.S. at 554. See Mintz, supra note 11, at 171. “If this narrow construction
is furthered the problem arises of what, exactly, the police office will be held responsible for
knowing.” Id. See also U.S. v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 391 (1973) (holding that probable
cause to arrest a suspect also justifies a search of that suspect incident to arrest).
117

Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939) (allowing courts to admit evidence if the
causal connection between the illegal search and the evidence is sufficiently attenuated).
118

371 U.S. 471 (1963) (holding that narcotics discovered from statements made by an
illegally arrested defendant did not come under the independent source exception).
119
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (holding that despite illegal questioning of a
defendant, which lead to the discovery of the victims body, the search party would have
inevitably discovered the body).
120
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (holding that the Court must sometimes
consider competing goals of interest: deterring official misconduct or removing procedures
under which criminal defendants are acquitted based on evidence that might expose the truth).
See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995) (holding that exclusion of evidence based on
incorrect court records kept by court employees would not deter the employees from keeping
erroneous records since they were not involved in the arrest process). The Constitution does
not expressly forbid the use of evidence collected in an illegal search, the Court stated that the
exclusionary rule does not apply to all Fourth Amendment violations. Id. at 10-16.
121

Mintz, supra note 11, at 164.

122

267 U.S. 132 (1925) (holding that if a warrantless search and seizure is conducted on an
automobile made upon probable cause reasonably arising out of the circumstances known to
the seizing officer, the search and seizure is valid).
123

John R. Werner, Editor-In-Chief Note, Mobility Reconsidered: Extending the Carroll
doctrine to Moveable Items, 58 IOWA L. REV. 1134, 1145-49 (1973). The proposition that the
mobility of an automobile supplied the exigent circumstances for a search without a warrant
upon probable cause allowed the Carroll Doctrine to retain validity long after the National
Prohibition Act, Title II, ch. 85 §§ 25-26, 41 Stat. 315 (1919), on which it was based, was
repealed in 1935. Extending the doctrine allows the police to respond quickly to a situation
presented by a movable vehicle.
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doctrine, in Chambers v. Maroney,124 to include a lesser expectation of privacy when
an item is moveable.125
Along with a lesser expectation of privacy in an automobile, the Court began to
deal with cases involving containers in automobiles. In 1948 in United States v. Di
Re126 refused to extend the Carroll doctrine to include a search for containers of
contraband on the body of the occupant but did confirm that all warrantless searches
must be based on “reasonableness”.127 Even with a lesser expectation of privacy in
an automobile, the Court held in several cases that containers could only be searched
without a warrant under exigent circumstances,128 that the Fourth Amendment
requires the police obtain a search warrant to search a closed container found in an
automobile even though there is probable cause to believe that the container contains
contraband;129 and that an officer’s authority to possess a container is distinct from
his authority to examine it.130 There were some Justices who still believed that the
word “automobile” was not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment
disappeared.131
In United States v. Ross132 the Court, in an effort to reconcile the ChambersCarney, and Chadwick-Sanders lines of authority, held that if there exists probable
cause to search an entire car, then the authority to make a warrantless search of the
vehicle extends to containers within the vehicle in which contraband might be
concealed.133
124

399 U.S. 42, 48-52 (1970) (reaffirming the exemption from the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement and further holding that a warrantless search of a vehicle may be delayed
and conducted elsewhere if a warrantless search would have been proper at the time of the
initial seizure. The Court began to shift the focus to an expectation of privacy issue when in a
mobile vehicle).
125
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979) (holding that in contrast to a passenger’s reduced
expectation of privacy, the governmental interest in effective law enforcement would be
impaired without the ability to search the passenger’s belongings, since the automobile’s ready
mobility creates the risk that evidence or contraband will be permanently lost while a warrant
is obtained).
126

332 U.S. 581 (1998) (holding that the existence of reasonable cause for searching an
automobile believed to be carrying contraband does not warrant the search of an occupant
thereof, especially when if the contraband sought might be concealed on the person).
127

Id. at 585 (stating that the Fourth Amendment does not denounce all searches or
seizures, but only such as are unreasonable).
128

United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).

129

Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979).

130

Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980).

131

Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 443.

132
456 U.S. 798 (1982). The Court wanted to provide specific guidance to police and
courts in this recurring situation. Id. at 826. The Court reasoned that the scope of the
warrantless search of an automobile is not defined by the nature of the container but rather by
the object of the search and the places where there is probable cause to believe the contraband
will be found. Id. at 834.
133

Id. at 807.
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Finally, in 1991, the Rehnquist Court,134 looking for one clear-cut rule to govern
automobile searches135 overruled Chadwick-Sanders in California v. Acevedo,136
holding that containers in cars may be searched without a warrant whether the
probable cause is specific or general.137
IV. SUMMARY OF THE COURT’S OPINION
Justice Scalia wrote the opinion for the Court’s 6-3 decision. Justice Scalia
invoked British common law at the time of the Fourth Amendment’s creation as the
beginning point for the 1999 inquiry138 to determine whether a particular
governmental action is to be regarded as an unlawful search and seizure.139
The Court began its opinion with the contention that historical evidence shows
that the Framers would have regarded as acceptable a warrantless search of
containers in an automobile if there was probable cause.140 The Court relied on
United States v. Ross141 and California v. Acevedo142 to argue that during virtually the
entire history of our country, whether contraband had been transported in a horse
drawn carriage or in a 1921 roadster, it has been assumed that a lawful search of a
vehicle would include a search of any container that might conceal the object of the
search.143
The Court summarized the Ross holding, emphasizing that if probable cause
justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part
of the vehicle and its contents,144 adding that later cases have characterized Ross as
applying broadly to all containers within a car without qualification as to
ownership.145 The Court added that if the rule announced in Ross was limited to a

134

The Rehnquist Court 1986-Present. See Abraham, supra note 25, at 349-69 (for a
discussion on the make up of the Rehnquist Court and its views).
135

California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569 (1991).

136

Id. at 565.

137

Id. at 566-67.

138

Houghton, 526 U.S. at 299. (the Court cited Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931
(1995) and California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991)). Where that inquiry yields no
answer, we must evaluate the search or seizure under traditional standards of reasonableness
by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy
and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests. See, e.g., Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53,
(1995).
139

Id.

140

Id. at 300.

141

456 U.S. 798 (1982).

142

500 U.S. 565 (1991).

143

456 U.S. at 820 n.26.

144

Id. at 825.

145

500 U.S. 572.
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search of the contents of the belongings of the driver one would have expected the
Court to have expressed that limit in the Ross decision.146
Moreover, the Court declared that Ross was fully consistent—as the
Respondent’s proposal was not—with the balancing claim that a permissible scope
of a warrantless car search is defined by the object of the search and the places where
there is probable cause to believe it may be found.147 The Court then supported its
endorsement of Ross, declaring that “The critical element in a reasonable search is
not that the owner of the property is suspected of crime but that there is reasonable
cause to believe that the specific ‘things’ to be searched for and seized are located on
the property to which entry is sought.”148
The Court invoked historical evidence from the Founding era to buttress all of its
arguments. The Court likened present day police officers to 18th century customs
officials examining packages and containers without regard to probable cause for
each one149 in light of legislation enacted by Congress from 1789 through 1799 and
beyond.150
In this regard the Court noted that “even if the historical evidence, as described in
Ross, were thought to be equivocal, we would find that the balancing of relative
interest weighs decidedly in favor of allowing searches of a passenger’s
belongings.151 The Court also relied on Cardwell v. Lewis152 to support the
proposition that passengers, no less than drivers, possess a reduced expectation of
privacy with regard to the property that they transport in cars, which ‘travel public
thoroughfares’.153
Next the Court focused on the Wyoming Supreme Court’s finding that the
“physical proximity” test154 did not convince them that it provided the most
efficacious balance between legitimate individual and state interests.155 The Court
noted that a warrantless seizure and search of a passenger’s purse did not give rise to
the traumatic consequences156 of the type a search of one’s person would. The Court

146

456 U.S. at 834.

147

Id. at 824.

148

Zurcher v. Standford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556 (1978).

149

Houghton, 526 U.S. at 300-01.

150

Id. at 300.

151

Id. at 303.

152

417 U.S. 583 (1974) (allowing a warrantless search and seizure of an automobile parked
in a parking lot when the driver was elsewhere by looking into the automobile windows and
examining the exterior of the automobile).
153

Id. at 590.

154

State v. Andrews, 549 N.W.2d 210 (1996) (holding that police may search all items
found on the premises that are plausible repositories for the objects of the search, except those
worn by or in the physical possession of persons whose search is not authorized by the
warrant).
155

Houghton, 526 U.S. at 303.

156

Id.
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distinguished the instant facts from those of United States v. Di Re,157 where there
was a body search, and Ybarra v Illinois,158 where even a limited search of the outer
clothing constitutes a severe intrusion on cherished personal security.159
The Court then presented the dissent’s arguments and countered with criticisms
of the dissent’s “strange criterion” “obvious ownership” argument and the dissent’s
desire for individualized probable cause to search a passenger’s belongings.160
The Court ended its opinion by positing that if they were to invent and exception
from the historical practice that Ross described it would be perplexing that the
exception should only protect a passenger’s belongings rather than (more logically)
property belonging to anyone other than the driver.161
Justice Breyer concurred with the “understanding that history is meant to inform,
but not automatically to determine, the answer to a Fourth Amendment question”.162
Moreover, in an effort to forestall the destruction of the bright-line rule established in
Ross, Justice Breyer pointed out that the scope of the Court’s bright-line rule
“Obviously . . . applies only to containers found within automobiles”.163 Justice
Breyer’s concurrence ended with his understanding that a purse is a “special
container” and that he was tempted to say “the search of a purse involves an
intrusion so similar to a search of one’s person that the same rule should govern
both”.164 However, in the end, he retreated from this line of argument and stated that
Court has warned against making distinctions of this kind165 unless the woman’s
purse, like a man’s billfold, were attached to her person,166 which in this case it was
not.167
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, dissented from the
holding of the majority.168 The Justices began their dissent by making it very clear
that there is an established precedent for warrants and individualized suspicion based
on specific probable cause.169 Furthermore, the dissent stated that in all prior cases
the automobile exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement applied
157

332 U.S. 581 (1948).

158

444 U.S. 85 (1979).

159

Id. at 88.

160

526 U.S. at 303-07.

161

Id. at 305.

162

Id. at 307. (Breyer, J., concurring).

163

Id. at 308. (Breyer, J., concurring).

164

Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).

165

526 U.S. at 308. (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that it cannot necessarily be argued
that the fact that the container was a purse automatically makes a legal difference (citing Ross,
456 U.S. at 822)).
166

Id. (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that outer clothing receives increased protection
(citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 24)).
167

Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).

168

Id. at 309. (Stevens, J., Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

169

Id. (Stevens, J., Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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only to the owner/defendant of the automobile.170 The dissent explained that in Di
Re, the only case involving a search of a passenger/defendant, the Court
overwhelmingly held that the exception to the warrant requirement did not apply.171
In this section of the opinion, the dissent maintained that the Majority has
fashioned a new rule rather than adhering to the settled distinctions between drivers
and passengers.172 The dissent stated that the “newly minted test”173 is based on a
distinction between property contained in clothing worn by a passenger and property
in a “container” and it is quite plain that the intrusion on any container is as serious
as the intrusion on clothing (as in Di Re).174
Next, the dissent delineated the ruling in Ross to mean that the Court had rejected
the notion that the scope of the warrantless search be defined by the nature of the
container.175 Rather, Ross was concerned with the object of the search and the places
where there was probable cause to believe it might be found.176 The dissent
categorically stated that they disapproved of a container-based distinction between a
man’s pocket and a woman’s purse.177 Moreover, the dissent was unconvinced by
the “mere spatial association”178 between a passenger and a driver that the majority
used as an acceptable basis for ignoring the privacy interests in a purse.179
In the last part of the opinion, the dissent addressed the balancing view of the
State’s legitimate interests in effective law enforcement and privacy issues.180 The
dissent explained that to their knowledge the Court has never restricted themselves to
a two-step Fourth Amendment approach “wherein the privacy and governmental
interests at stake must be considered only if 18th century common law ‘yields no
answer’.181

170

526 U.S. at 309. (Stevens, J., Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

171

Id. (Stevens, J., Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

172

Id. at 309-10. (Stevens, J., Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

173

Id. (Stevens, J., Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

174

Id. at 309 (Stevens, J., Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

175

526 U.S. at 310. (Stevens, J., Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

176

Id. (Stevens, J., Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

177

Id. (Stevens, J., Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

178

Id. (Stevens, J., Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

179

Id. (Stevens, J., Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., dissenting). “We are not convinced that a
person, by mere presence in a suspected car, loses immunities from a search of his person to
which he would be otherwise entitled.” (citing United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 587
(1948)). See also Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997) (emphasizing individualized
suspicion); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979) (explaining that a person’s “mere
propinquity” to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more,
give rise to probable cause to search that person).
180

526 U.S. at 311. (Stevens, J., Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

181

Id. (Stevens, J., Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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In sum, the dissent concluded that there was no reason to expand the ruling in
Carroll to justify this arrest and search as incident to the search of the car.182 The
dissent suggested that the Court had crafted an imaginative response to Di Re as well
as being unable to support its own historical recitation. Finally, the dissent stated
that it was thankful that the Court’s automobile-centered extension of the warrant
exception is limited in scope but concluded that it “does not justify the outcome in
this case”.183
V. ANALYSIS
This Note contends that the Court’s decision to adopt a container-based approach
to the automobile warrant exception, to allow searches of passenger belongings
based on the driver’s misconduct, is problematic. The Houghton Court was wrong to
adopt this new exception for three reasons. First, the Court has erroneously
interpreted the historical evidence behind the creation of the Fourth Amendment.
Second, the Court, by chipping away at stare decisis, is disrupting the foundations of
American jurisprudence and the development of the law. Third, by creating a new
lexicon, changing the meanings of the words, the Court is trying to define away the
protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment.
A. Original Intent184 and Tradition: The Only Guides to the
Fourth Amendment Question.
Using original intent185 as the first step in determining the meaning of what
protections the Fourth Amendment affords at the end of the 20th century is the
present Court’s first line of attack.
Justice Scalia considers the text of the Constitution to take priority over
everything else and has characterized himself as an originalist186 who relies on the
intentions of the Framers as revealed historically. Thus, Justice Scalia in the
majority opinion invokes British common law as it existed in the 18th century as the
starting point for his argument concerning the meaning of the Fourth Amendment187
today. Herein lies the problem. The crucial issue is not what (British) common law
required but what the Fourth Amendment requires.188 If constitutional interpretation
is simply a matter of identifying whether an historical practice was permitted in

182

Id. at 312.

183

Id. at 313. (Stevens, J., Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

184

Levy, supra note 76. The term “original intent” stands for an old idea (emphasis added)
that the Court should interpret the Constitution according to the understanding of it by the
Framers.
185

Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., Ordered Liberty: The Original Intent of the Constitution, 47
MD. L. REV. 174, 175 (1987). Original intent is viewed by some to mean that the courts and
other branches of government should be bound by what can be divined of the intentions of
those who wrote or ratified the Constitution. Adherents to this position obtain solace from the
supposed certainty of the static meaning provided in the face of changing circumstnaces.
186

Antonin Scalia, Essay, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).

187

Houghton, 526 U.S. at 300.

188

Maclin, supra note 47, at 961.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1999

21

596

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:575

1789, it would be better to appoint historians to the Court and leave lawyers on the
sidelines. The country expects and deserves more than a history seminar when our
fundamental rights are at stake.189 The purpose behind the creation of the Fourth
Amendment and the Constitution is that the Framers meant the Constitution to mean
more than it says, and more than they could have conceived.190
Tradition is another of Justice Scalia’s routes to interpretation of the Constitution.
Justice Scalia sees traditionalism as a corollary to originalism.191 In Houghton,
Justice Scalia states that when a historical inquiry yields no answers, one must look
at traditional standards to decipher the meaning of “reasonableness”, “intrusion on
individual privacy” and “governmental interests”.192 Thus, when Justice Scalia
compares the needs of customs officers in the 1780’s and 1790’s to present day
police officers193 he is creating two problems.
First, the Court’s comprehension of history and its traditions is selective.
Selective understanding scans the past with a narrow focus and, in particular, with a
view toward using the past to extract a definitive authoritative rule to resolve
problems in the present.194
Utilizing a selective view allows the majority to justify a container-based search
without individualized probable cause for the person because the “interpretation”
sees customs officers at common law, and for a short period in 1789, doing so and
hence it must mean that the “interpretation “ is applicable today.195 Of course, the
paradox is that history shows that the Revolution was fought and the Fourth
Amendment created over just such problematic beliefs.196
189
Tracey Maclin, Article, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment is Worse Than the
Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 46 (1994).
190
Id. (citing TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 41
(1969)); Taylor is considered a trailblazer for those rejecting the warrant preference rule. Id.
at 11.
191
David A. Strauss, Tradition, Precedent, and Justice Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1699,
1710 (1991). Strauss believes that Scalia is positively reverential in his views about tradition.
Id. at 1700.
192

526 U.S. at 300.

193

Id.

194

Robert A. Burt, Precedent and Authority in Antonin Saclia’s Jurisprudence, 12
CARDOZO L. REV. 1685, 1690 (1991).
195
Maclin, supra note 47, at 19-20. When the proposed federal Constitution was debated in
the Virginia Convention, Patrick Henry protested that federal excisemen could use general
warrants to search cellars and bedrooms and seize any person without evidence of any crime.
Henry protested against suspicionless searches whether or not carried out pursuant to general
warrants. Would anybody at the Convention have dared respond: “Settle down Pat, we’ll
solve our problem, we’ll abolish general warrants—we’ll just let federal officers conduct the
searches whenever and wherever they want without acting pursuant to general warrants.
Congress will simply enact a law that permits it.” In sum, the search and seizure practices of
British authorities were opposed because of the arbitrary power exercised by customs officers
(emphasis added) and Crown officials. The Fourth Amendment was adopted to deter federal
officers from exercising similar unrestrained power. Id.
196
For what Justice Sandra Day O’Connor called the best historical presentation of
American Fourth Amendment history see William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment:
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Second, our contemporary obligation to the past should not arise because we are
constituted by our forebearers, but rather the past should derive from the same
fundamental principle that comprises our obligations to one another today; our
commitment to consensual relationships based on mutually acknowledged
equality.197
Commitment to a consensual egalitarian conception of social
relationships requires loyalty, but not subservience, to the past.198
Arbitrarily fixing meaning at the intent of the founders robs America of the
power to consent. It dismisses two centuries of national dialogue with the
Constitution and it ignores the significant growth in our understanding of the “Novus
Ordo Seclorum” the Framers established.199 Why should we who have been molded
by that history, not participate in that debate?200 In his concurrance in Houghton,
even Justice Breyer conceded that “History is meant to inform, but not automatically
to determine, the answer to the Fourth Amendment question.”201
B. Disrupting the Orderly Development of the Law: The End of Stare Decisis in
Fourth Amendment Cases
The question of why precedent should matter so much,202 has been heatedly
debated by scholars for years.203 The usual response is that the law values
certainty.204 But, given the Court’s sometimes quite rapid departure from precedent
when it believes a particular precedent is unsound, perhaps the best answer is an
institutional one: the Court is most qualified to read cases, especially it’s own.205
Origins and Original Meaning (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School:
available from UMI Dissertation Services, 300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan).
197

Burt, supra note 194, at 1669.

198

Id. at 1697.

199

Mathias, supra note 185, at 176-77.

200

Id. at 177. Justice Marshall stated, “When the Founders used the phrase “We the
People” in 1787, they did not have in mind the majority of America’s citizens. A civil war,
twenty-six amendments, and tremendous social, political, and technological changes have put
flesh on the bones of the Constitution, thus altering our reading and our relationship to it. Why
should we ignore history when we read the Constitution?” Id.
201

526 U.S. at 307 (Breyer, J., concurring).

202

Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Article, Levels of Generality in the Definition of
Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1064 (1990). See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously,
38 HARV. L. REV. 102 (1977) (for a view that stare decisis is not a rule but a principle that may
be outweighed by other principles).
203

Id. at 1064. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of
Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1189-90 (1987). Most judges,
lawyers, and commentators recognize the relevance of at least five types of constitutional
argument: arguments from the plain, necessary, or historical meaning of the constitutional
text; arguments about the intent of the framers; arguments of constitutional theory that reason
from the hypothesized purposes that best explain either particular constitutional provisions or
the constitutional text as a whole; arguments based on judicial precedent; and value arguments
that assert claims about justice or social policy. Id.
204

Tribe, supra note 202, at 1064.

205

Id.
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Rightly or wrongly, constitutional meaning occurs primarily in the interpretation of
prior cases.206
In 1990, Justice Powell noted that reliance on precedent in general, and on stare
decisis in particular, is important in constitutional cases because after two centuries
of vast change, the original intent of the Founders is difficult to discern or is
irrelevant.207
More than any other Justice sitting today, Antonin Scalia is ready to reverse208
prior Supreme Court precedent.209 Some scholars believe that Justice Scalia’s view
on precedent relies on Oliver Wendell Holmes’ famous aphorism that “it is revolting
to have no better reason for a rule of law than it was laid down in the time of Henry
IV.”210 Yet others believe, connected to his originalism and traditionalism, he would
find this anathema, rejecting the idea that the Constitution must change from age to
age.211 Still, this categorically contradicts his originalist conception of being fully
committed to the Framers meaning of the Constitution.212
So why is Justice Scalia so open to overruling past cases? The paradox lies in
what some believe to be his quick use of abstract principles that are insensitive to
practical realities and his cavalier attitude toward the views of past Justices who had
thought carefully about the issues.213
The Court in Houghton has for all intents and purposes overruled Di Re214
making a passenger’s “mere presence” in an automobile enough justification to
require a search of the passenger’s belongings when there is only probable cause to
206
Id. The Court has nominally based even its boldest innovations in constitutional law
upon precedent. For instance, Justice Stone argued that state-sanctioned discriminatory
practices against “discrete and insular minorities” merit a diminished presumption of
constitutionality neither because he believed such discrimination was intrinsically evil, nor
because the structure of the Constitution marks discrete and insular minorities as special but
rather, because he located this principle in prior cases. Id. (citing United States v. Carolene
Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)).
207

Lewis F. Powell, Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 281,
289 (1990).
208

See Strauss, supra note 191, at 1699 (“[w]e knew from the start that Justice Scalia was
not a great fan of stare decisis”).
209
Burt, supra note 194, at 1685. See United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 692 (1987)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (calling for the overruling of Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135
(1950)); Puerto Rico v. Barnstad, 483 U.S. 219 (1987) (overruling Kentucky v. Dennison, 65
U.S. 66 (1861)); Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987) (overruling O’Callahan v.
Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969)); Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington State Dep’t of Revenue, 483
U.S. 232, 259-65 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (questioning
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1852)); Welch v. Texas Dep’t of Highways and
Pub. Tansp, 483 U.S. 468 (1987) (overruling Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. Docks Dep’t, 377
U.S. 184 (1964).
210

O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 187 (1920).

211

Burt, supra note 194, at 1686-87.

212

Id. at 1688.

213

Id. at 1700.

214

332 U.S. 581 (1948).
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search the driver. Moreover, the Court has overruled the true holding in Ross,215
which concluded that the historical evidence that permits a warrantless search “is
defined by the object of the search and where the places in which there is probable
cause to believe that it may be found.”216 By so doing, the Court has also overruled
its previous view of what history had informed them to be the correct view of an
exception to the warrant requirement based on probable cause for persons.217 “The
People” and individualized probable cause are gone and the police have now taken
the place of the neutral magistrate in deciding what is reasonable.218
C. The New Lexicon: Define Away Fourth Amendment Protections
In every language there are assumptions that give meaning to a text. The external
world and cultural experiences also supply an extra-textual meaning to a language.
But, people speak to each other or write novels or laws or journal articles because
they accept that they are each supplying the same irreducible meaning.219 The Court
in Houghton seems to be redefining the irreducible meanings that as a society we
have all agreed upon.
We the people of the United States of America agree to the irreducible meaning
of the concepts upon which our nation was founded. First, that all men are
“endowed with certain unalienable rights220 that among these are life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights, governments are instituted among
men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed”.221 Second, We
the people, agree that those who won our independence believed that the final end of
the State was to make men free to develop their faculties. We agree that in
government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary, that the value of
liberty is both an end and a means and that liberty is the secret of happiness and
courage the secret of liberty.222 Finally, we all agree upon the irreducible meaning
that the Framers of the Constitution conferred, as against the Government, the right
to be left alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men.223

215

456 U.S. 798 (1982).

216

Id. at 824.

217

526 U.S. at 307. The Court’s decision in Ross was based on a similar historical inquiry.

Id.
218

Maclin, supra note 47, at 13 (stating that the warrant requirement tells us, and the
police, that unsupervised searches should not be the norm, that warrantless intrusions must be
justified by more than convenience (cost-benefit analysis), and that police discretion should be
restrained).
219

Tribe, supra note 202, at 1204-07.

220

Other state constitutions also reflect agreement. “All men are born free and equal, and
have certain natural, essential and unalienable rights.” MASS. CONST. (1778).
221

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (U.S. 1776).

222

Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

223

277 U.S. 438, 478 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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The dissent in Houghton believes that based on its imaginative footnote in Di
Re224 the Court had changed the focus from Di Re’s status as mere occupant of the
vehicle and the importance of individualized suspicion, to a case concerning
“reasonableness” of the intrusion.225 This redefinition of the meaning of Di Re
allowed the Court to expand the Carroll Doctrine and remove immunities from a
search by mere presence in an automobile.226
The Court also redefines the meaning of words. Container, usually defined as a
receptacle, in Houghton includes a purse, usually defined as a woman’s handbag
used for carrying money and personal items.227 The distinction drawn between a
suitcase228 and a very personal belonging, a purse, that women wear is gone.229 Even
Justice Breyer in his concurrence felt uneasy with this new synonymous definition.
Moreover, Justice Breyer also seemed to intuit that a purse was more like a man’s
billfold230 than a receptacle. Reconfiguring the holding of previous Courts and
redefining the Fourth Amendment is putting the exclusionary rule in jeopardy. With
similar cases being heard before state courts231 today, the magnitude of Houghton
will be felt momentarily.
The Constitution succeeded in solving the pressing problems the young nation
faced in 1787. It was designed to prevent tyranny, rather than promote efficiency. It
was designed to focus governmental power on its legitimate objectives . . . to remain
fenced out of our houses and the private precincts of our lives.232 Let us hope that
Justice Breyer is correct and the Court’s “newly minted” test confines itself only to

224

332 U.S. 581 (1948).

225

526 U.S. at 311 n.2.

226

Id. at 300. The dissent stated that it saw no reason to extend Carroll in this way. Id.
(Stevens, J., Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
227

THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1989).

228

United States v. Robbins, 453 U.S. 420 (1973); Sanders, 422 U.S. at 753; United States
v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); Ross, 456 U.S. at 798; Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491
(1983); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983); United States v. Place, 463 U.S. 696 (1983);
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
229

Houghton, 526 U.S. at 295.

230

Id. at 308.

231

United States v. 404,905.00 in United States Currency, 182 F.3d 643 (8th Cir. 1999);
United States v. Buckner, 179 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Zabala, 52 F. Supp. 2d
377 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Avery v. Mitchell, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5670 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 20,
1999); United States v. Hambrick, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10384 (W.D. Va. July 7, 1999);
People v. Hart, 1999 Cal. App. LEXIS 776 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. Aug. 23, 1999); People v.
Cartwright, 72 Cal. App. 4th 1362 (Cal. App. 1999); Baldwin v. Reagan, 715 N.E.2d 332 (Ind.
1999); State v. Lux, 1999 ME 136 (Me. 1999); State v. Salvato, Hamilton County App. No. C980939, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 3716 (Ohio Ct. App., Hamilton County Aug. 13, 1999); State
v. Hirning, 592 N.W.2d 600 (S.D. 1999); Newman v. State, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 5043
(Tex. App. Dallas July 9, 1999); Gallegos v. State, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 5042 (Tex. App.
Dallas July 9, 1999); Hayes v. Commonwealth, 514 S.E.2d 357 (Va. App. 1999); State v.
Matejka, 1999 Wisc. App. LEXIS 966 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 1999).
232

Mathias, supra note 185, at 179.
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Fourth Amendment automobile exceptions to the exclusionary rule, and will not
extend to our bodies or our homes. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious
encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.233

233

See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928). (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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